Abstract. We explain a variant of the Fiat-Shamir identification and signature protocol which is based on the intractability of computing generators of principal ideals in algebraic number fields. We also show how to use the Cohen-Lenstra-Martinet heuristics for class groups to construct number fields in which computing generators of principal ideals is intractable.
Introduction
The security of public key cryptosystems is based on the intractability of computational problems in mathematics and in particular in number theory. Examples are the problems of factoring integers or computing discrete logarithms in certain finite abelian groups (see [23] ). However, there is currently no such problem whose computational difficulty can be proved. On the contrary: Experience with the factoring problem shows that unexpected breakthroughs are always possible. To guarantee that public key cryptography is possible even if the currently used systems are broken, it is necessary to identify alternative computational problems which can be used as the basis of public key schemes.
In this paper, we consider the principal ideal problem (PIP): Let O be an order of an algebraic number field F . Given a principal O-ideal I, find a generator of that ideal, i.e. an element α ∈ F such that I = αO. We show how to use the heuristics of Cohen, Lenstra, and Martinet ( [13] , [14] , [15] , and [16] ) for class groups of algebraic number fields to generate orders for which PIP is intractable, and we present PIP-FS, a variant of the Fiat-Shamir identification and signature scheme [17] whose security is based on PIP. We describe an implementation of PIP-FS in real quadratic fields, we show that it is secure, and we present timings which show that PIP-FS has the potential to become practical.
PIP is a special case of the number field discrete logarithm problem (NFDL), which was introduced in [6] . There, it has been suggested to develop cryptographic primitives based on NFDL. For number fields with large class number, this has been done in [2] . Here, we present first schemes for number fields with large regulators, and we show how to generate such fields. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present a general version of the Fiat-Shamir protocols (FS). In Section 3, we explain PIP-FS, a FS variant based on PIP in number fields. A detailed description of the implementation of PIP-FS in real quadratic number fields is given in Section 4.
Fiat-Shamir identification
In this section, we present a fairly general version of the Fiat-Shamir identification protocol (FS). (For generalizations of the original Fiat-Shamir scheme [17] , see also [11] and [10] .)
The goal of the FS protocol is that one party, called the prover, convinces the other party, called the verifier, of his knowledge of a secret key without revealing any relevant information concerning that secret key. We will also explain how a digital signature scheme can be obtained from this protocol.
In the setup phase of the protocol, the prover and the verifier agree on two abelian groups G and H, on a homomorphism ϕ : G → H, and on a positive integer k. The prover selects k group elements g i ∈ G, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The sequence (g 1 , . . ., g k ) is his private key. He then computes h i = ϕ(g i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The sequence (h 1 , . . ., h k ) is his public key.
The FS identification protocol works as follows:
1. (Commitment and Witness) The prover randomly selects a commitment g ∈ G and computes the witness h = ϕ(g) . The prover sends the witness h to the verifier. 2. (Challenge) The verifier selects a challenge e ∈ {0, 1} k and sends it to the prover. 
Clearly, a prover who knows the secret key can convince the verifier of his identity. Assume that ϕ has the following one way property: Without knowledge of the secret key, it is intractable to compute, given (f 1 , . . ., f k ) ∈ {0, ±1} k where at least one f i is not 0, an s with ϕ(s) = k i=1 h fi i . We show that the probability to detect that a prover does not know the secret key is at least 1 − 1/2 k . To increase the probability, the basic protocol can be repeated several times.
If the prover is able to give the correct answer for two different challenges (e 1 , . . ., e k ) and (e 1 , . . . , e k ), then he knows r, r ∈ G such that ϕ(r) = h
i . This implies that he can compute s = r r −1 such that
. Note that e i − e i ∈ {0, ±1}. By assumption, computing s without the knowledge of the secret key is intractable. Therefore, a cheating prover cannot know the correct answer for two different challenges, and the probability for him to be detected is at least 1 − 1/2 k . When we explain our variant PIP-FS in Section 3, we will also show that the verifier or an observer are not able to derive the secret key from information transmitted during the protocol.
The FS identification protocol is efficient if multiplication in the groups G and H can be performed efficiently and if the homomorphism ϕ can be computed efficiently.
In the following way, the FS identification protocol can be transformed into a signature protocol. Suppose a document d is to be signed. The signer selects a commitment g and computes the witness h as in the above protocol. To generate the challenge, the signer uses a cryptograpic hash function f (see [23] ). He computes f (d • h) where • is concatenation and d, h are identified with the bit strings by which they are represented. The challenge is the sequence of the first k bits of the hash value. The signature consists of the witness and the reply. The verifier computes the challenge from the witness and the document and proceeds as in the FS protocol.
PIP-FS
We explain PIP-FS, our FS variant which is based on the intractability of solving the principal ideal problem in number fields. Let F be an algebraic number field and let O be an order of F . In the Fiat-Shamir protocol, we use the multiplicative group F * of all non-zero elements in F , the multiplicative group
of principal fractional O-ideals, and the homomorphism
With this choice of G, H, and ϕ, the general Fiat-Shamir protocol described in the previous section can be implemented. We call the resulting protocol PIP-FS.
In order for PIP-FS to be secure, inverting ϕ must be intractable. Inverting ϕ means solving the principal ideal problem for O-ideals. We discuss the difficulty of this PIP. The two most efficient methods known for solving the principal ideal problem are the babystep-giantstep algorithm [5] [1] and the index calculus method [26] [4] . The running time of the babystep-giantstep algorithm is
where n is the degree of F , ∆ is the discriminant of O, and R is the regulator of O. More precisely, the following is true. Let I be a principal O-ideal. Let α be a generator of I such that the euclidean length of the logarithmic embedding of α (see [3] ) is minimal, and let a be that length. Then α can be computed in time
. The running time of the index calculus algorithm is exp(O(n log n)(log ∆ log log(∆)) 1/2 ). Thus, in order for the principal ideal problem to be intractable, the discriminant, the regulator, and the minimal logarithmic length of the generators must be sufficiently large. We note that no Pohlig-Hellman attack (see [23] ) is known for PIP. Therefore, no further condition for the order O appears to be necessary.
For the appropriate choice of the order O, we use the analytic class number formula [3] and the heuristics of Cohen, Lenstra, and Martinet ( [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] ). The analytic class number formula tells us that the product of the class number h and the regulator R of the algebraic number field F is asymptotically proportional to |∆| where ∆ is the discriminant of F . The heuristics of Cohen, Lenstra, and Martinet predict when the class number is small with very high probability. Thus, if we choose the number field F 1. with sufficiently large discriminant in order to make index calculus attack infeasable and 2. with small class number (using the heuristics of Cohen, Lenstra, and Martinet), then the principal ideal problem appears to be intractable.
Next, we must answer the question how the keys, commitment, witness, challenge, and respose are selected or computed. The idea is to use reduced principal O-ideals and their generators. We will explain this in detail for the case of real quadratic orders. The methods explained for these orders can be generalized to general orders. This will be explained in a forthcoming paper.
PIP-FS in real quadratic fields
In this section, we show how to implement PIP-FS using a real quadratic order in which the principal ideal problem is intractable. In particular, we explain 1. how the order O is selected, 2. how the private key and the commitment are selected and represented, 3. how the public key, the witness, and the response are computed and represented, and 4. how the verification is performed. We let O be a real quadratic order of discriminant ∆, class number h, and regulator R. By F we denote the field of fractions of O.
4.1. The order. As explained in Section 3, we have to choose the order O such that both the index calculus algorithm and the babystep-giantstep algorithm cannot be used to solve the principal ideal problem in O. We will, in fact, choose O as a maximal order.
The most efficient variant of the index calculus algorithm that is currently known is due to Jacobson [20] . Extrapolating experiments with Jacobson's algorithm, Hamdy [18] found that the difficulty of applying the index calculus algorithm in an order with a 687 bit discriminant is the same as the difficulty of factoring a 1024 bit number with the number field sieve. Therefore, we require that
Further comparisons can be found in Table 1 .
Factoring PIP-FS  1024  687  1536  958  2048  1208  3072  1665  4096 2084 Table 1 . Comparison of factoring with the number field sieve and solving PIP-FS with index calculus.
To make the babystep-giantstep attack impossible, we choose the order such that
where k 1 ≥ 160 is a security parameter. The reason for this choice is given in Section 4.5.
To satisfy requirement (2), we choose ∆ to be the product of two random primes p 1 , p 2 ≡ 3 mod 4. We will show below that, assuming the Cohen-Lenstra heuristics [13] and the extended Riemann hypothesis, condition (2) is satisfied with probability
For example, if k 1 + k 2 = 240, we obtain that ∆ should be larger than 2 504 . So if (1) holds, then (2) is satisfied. Choosing ∆ to be the product of two primes has additional appeal when these primes are not disclosed. Being able to solve PIP for arbitrary reduced principal ideals implies being able to factor the discriminant ( [8] , [25] ). Thus in this case PIP is provably at least as hard as breaking RSA and other crypto-systems based on factoring integers. So let us explain why it suffices to choose ∆ according to (3) . Since ∆ is squarefree, O is a maximal order. We can relate the regulator R to the class number h by using the analytic class number formula [3] :
Assuming the ERH, we have, by a result of Littlewood [22] , that L(1, χ) > (1+o (1)) (12e γ /π 2 ) ln ln ∆ −1 where γ = 0.5772 . . . is Euler's constant (cf. [24] , where it is also discussed how 1 + o(1) can be replaced by explicit bounds). As 12e (1))(ln ln ∆) −1 , and from this we obtain the new condition
We now examine the class number h in more detail. For the even part of h, we can use well-known theorems from genus theory [19] : Since ∆ is the product of two primes p 1 , p 2 ≡ 3 (mod 4), the class number h is always odd. For estimating the odd part of the class number, we apply the heuristics of Cohen and Lenstra [13] with the assumption that our restriction on the choice of ∆ does not affect the statistical behaviour of the odd part of the class number. Then the probability that h > x is asymptotic to 1/(2x) (cf. [13] , § 9, (C12) a). With probability at least 1 − 2 −k2 , we have h ≤ 2 k2 . By substituting this into (4), we obtain the condition
Assuming that ∆ is large enough such that 1+o(1) can be omitted, we arrive at (3).
4.2.
Reduced O-ideals. To implement PIP-FS in O, we use reduced O-ideals, which we describe in this section. For more details on reduced ideals, we refer to [9] , [12] , and [1] . Every fractional O-ideal I has a representation
where q is a positive rational number, a is a positive integer, and b is an integer.
The numbers q and a are uniquely determined. The integer b is unique modulo 2a.
We represent I by (q, a, b, c) where c = (b 2 − ∆)/(4a). If q = 1, then we write I = (a, b, c) .
This implies that the number of reduced O-ideals is finite. For example, the order O itself is a reduced principal O-ideal.
We explain the reduction operator ρ, which is the basic algorithmic primitive in reduction theory of O-ideals. If I = (q, a, b, c) is an O-ideal, then
We can also write this as
If I is not reduced, then a reduced ideal J that is equivalent to I and an element γ ∈ F * with J = γI can be computed as follows.
1. Set γ = 1 and J = I. 2. While J is not reduced, replace γ by γα(J) and J by ρ(J). This algorithm terminates with the correct result in quadratic time. We write γ = γ(I) and J = reduce(I).
The fact that reduction of O-ideals is possible in polynomial time implies the following theorem, which shows that using only reduced O-ideals does not harm the security of PIP-FS. 
which can also be written as
We also have 0 < ln α(I) < (ln ∆)/2 (10) and ln α(I) + ln α(ρ(I)) ≥ ln 2. (11) From (10) and (11), we obtain the following lemma, which is used in the construction of the secret and public key and the committment and witness. Proof. Let r > 0. Set I 0 = O, α 0 = 1, I i+1 = ρ(I i ), α i+1 = α i α(I i ). Then I i is a reduced O-ideal with generator α i , α i > 0, 0 < ln α i+1 − ln α i = ln α(I i ) < (ln ∆)/2 by (10) and (11) , and lim i→∞ ln α i = ∞ by (11) . This implies the assertion. For r < 0, the proof is analogous and uses ρ −1 .
4.3.
Secret key, commitment, public key, and witness. Assume that ∆ is chosen as described in Section 4.1. The secret key and the commitment are chosen such that the corresponding principal ideal problems are difficult. We now explain how we can choose them as generators of reduced principal ideals.
It follows from Theorem 4.1 that is is not harder to solve PIP for O-ideals than for reduced O-ideals. Therefore, we may limit ourselves to generators of reduced Oideals when choosing the secret key and the commitment. We denote the set of all reduced principal O-ideals by P 0 . The public key and the witnesses are computed using the function close : N → P 0 , which is described in Section 4.6. Here, we use the following properties of that function:
1. Given n ∈ N, the value close(n) can be computed in polynomial time.
2. For every n ∈ N, there is a positive generator α of close(n) with |ln α − cn| < (ln ∆)/4 + 1, where c = (ln ∆)/2 + 2 . It can be computed in polynomial time. 3. The restriction of close to any interval of 2 k1 consecutive integers is injective, where k 1 ≥ 160 is chosen as in Section 4.1. To generate the secret key, the prover randomly chooses k integers n 1 , . . ., n k in [0, 2 k1 − 1]. The corresponding public key is (I 1 , . . ., I k ) with I i = close(n i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ k. For the generation of the commitment, we need two more security parameters k 2 , k 3 ∈ N. The integer k 2 is chosen such that an event that happens with probability 1/2 k2 is considered practically impossible. Parameter k 3 is chosen such that 2 k3 is an upper bound for the number of applications of the PIP-FS protocol with one key pair. For example, k 3 = 30 allows to use the same key pair every second for more than 30 years. The commitment is a random integer n ∈ [0, 2 − 1], = k 1 + k 2 + k 3 + 1. The witness is I = close(n).
4.4.
Response and verification. Let ∆ and c be as in Section 4.1. Let (n 1 , . . ., n k ) be the private key and (I 1 , . . ., I k ) the corresponding public key, both chosen as in the previous section. Assume that n is a commitment, I = close(n) is the corresponding witness, and (e 1 , . . ., e k ) ∈ [0, 1] k is the challenge. Then the response is r = n + k i=1 e i n i . Using r, the verifier is able to verify that there is a generator of I k i=1 I ei i that is close to cr. This is explained in Section 4.7.
4.5. Security. We explain why PIP-FS as described is secure. Let P 1 = {close(n) : n ∈ [0, . . ., 2 k1 − 1]}. As close is injective on the interval [0, . . ., 2 k1 − 1], it is impossible to tabulate the elements of P 1 with generators or to guess a secret key yielding the same public key. We analyze the time required to compute a generator of an element I of P 1 . Let I = close(n) with n ∈ [0, 2 k1 − 1]. Since by (2) we have R ≥ c · 2 k1 , it follows that the logarithm of the smallest positive generator of I is approximately cn. Therefore, the babystep-giantstep algorithm [1] for computing a generator of I takes 2 k1/2 ∆ o(1) bit operations. So it is impossible to compute a generator of I this way. Also, by choice of ∆, determining a generator of I by the index calculus algorithm is impossible. Hence, computing generators for elements of Now we show that knowledge of values of r, collected from up to 2 k3 executions of the protocol, with overwhelming probability does not allow the verifier or an observer to deduce any sub-sum of the secrets n 1 , . . ., n k . For simplicity, assume that an attacker targets only n 1 , which is most easily done by always using the challenge (1, 0, . . ., 0) , so that r = n + n
k1 − 2 > 0 or n < 2 k1 − 1, respectively. Thus, for uniformly chosen n ∈ [0, 2 − 1], the probability is less than 2 · 2 k1− . Combined over 2 k3 iterations of the protocol, the probability still is less than 1
, which by choice of k 2 ist considered negligible.
4.6. The function close. Let k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , , k, O, F , ∆, and R be as in Section 4.3. We explain the implementation of a function
with the properties from Section 4.3 where P 0 is the set of all reduced principal Oideals. We will show that this function restricted to any interval of 2 k1 consecutive integers is injective, and that for any n ∈ N the ideal close(n) has a positive generator α with |ln α − cn| < (ln ∆)/4 + 1 where
This function is used for the generation of the public key, the computation of the witness, and in the verification.
Let n ∈ N. The algorithm computes b = log 2 n + 1, i.e. the binary length of n, and t = cn/2 b . Then it recursively computes, for 0 ≤ i ≤ b, reduced O-ideals I i that have positive generators α i with
and returns I b = close(n).
To initialize the recursion, an O-ideal I 0 is computed which has a positive generator α 0 with |ln α 0 − t| < (ln ∆)/4 + 1. This is done by the following procedure:
1. Set I 0 = O, α 0 = 1. 2. While |ln α 0 − t| ≥ (ln ∆)/4, set α 0 = α 0 α(I 0 ) and I 0 = ρ(I 0 ). It follows from (10) and (11) that the algorithm terminates with the correct result after O(ln t) iterations of the while loop. Since the implementation uses rational approximations to the logarithms, it can only guarantee that |ln α 0 − t| < (ln ∆)/4+ 1 when the while-condition is found to be false. The details are explained below.
Next we explain the recursion. When I i has been found, i < b, then I i+1 is computed as follows. First, the ideal I is, in general, not reduced. To make I 2 i reduced, the reduction algorithm explained above is applied. It yields a reduced principal O-ideal I i+1 and an element γ i+1 ∈ F * such that I i+1 = γ i+1 I 2 i . If ln γ i+1 is too small, then we replace γ i+1 by γ i+1 α(I i+1 ) and I i+1 by ρ(I i+1 ) until (13) holds for α i+1 = γ i+1 α 2 i . If ln γ i+1 is too large, then we replace γ i+1 by γ i+1 /β(I i+1 ) and I i+1 by ρ −1 (I i+1 ) until (13) holds for α i+1 = γ i+1 α 2 i . Note that α i+1 is a generator of the reduced principal ideal I i+1 .
Because we can only work with approximations to the logarithms, things are somewhat more difficult. We explain the details. To obtain (13), we approximate ln α i by a rational number a i with
for 0 ≤ i ≤ b, and each γ i+1 is chosen such that
To find γ i+1 such that (16) holds, we work with rational approximations to the logarithms and modify the algorithm from above as follows: If, after reduction, the approximation to the logarithm γ i+1 is too small, we start with β 0 = γ i+1 and determine ideals J j = β j I 2 i by iterative application of ρ, such that 2 i+1 t − 2a i is larger than or equal to the approximation of ln β j−1 , but smaller than the approximation of ln β j . If the logarithm of γ i+1 is too large, we use ρ −1 instead. At the end, γ i+1 is replaced by β j−1 or β j , depending of which logarithm approximation is closer to 2 i+1 t − 2a i . This is done by the following procedure.
β j+1 = α(J j )β j , and compute b j+1 with |b j+1 − ln β j+1 | < 1/4; replace j by j + 1.
We prove that this procedure is correct. Proof. Let T , β j , b j be as in the procedure and let j be with the value at the end of the procedure. It is
The second case is ln
We can use the same arguments for the third case T < ln β j−1 .
The initial value α 0 is computed by executing the procedure with i = −1, I −1 = O, and a −1 = 0. Then the procedure determines γ 0 , and we set α 0 = γ 0 .
Finally, we remark that the approximations a i can be computed as follows. Each generator is of the form α i = . After γ j has been computed by the procedure above, we approximate its logarithm by c j such that |c j − ln γ j | < 2 −n+j−b−3 . We set a 0 = c 0 and a i+1 = 2a i + c i+1 . Then a i satisfies (15) for 0 ≤ i ≤ b.
4.7.
Implementing the verification. In the verification step, the verifier knows the positive integer r, the principal O-ideals I, I 1 , . . ., I k , and the exponents e 1 , . . ., e k ∈ {0, 1}. He wants to verify that the principal O-ideal I k i=1 I ei i has a positive generator α such that ln α is close to rc, where c is defined according to (12) .
The verifier uses the reduction algorithm from Section 4.2 to compute a reduced O-ideal J and γ ∈ F * with J = γI
. This is done as follows: 1. Set J = I, γ = 1. 2. For i = 1, . . ., k: If e i = 1, then replace γ by γγ(JI i ) and J by reduce(JI i ).
If α is a generator of I
has a positive generator whose logarithm is close to r and since ln γ is small, it follows that the reduced O-ideal J has a generator whose logarithm is close to r. The verifier can verify this by computing K = close(r) and by searching for J in the neighborhood of K. More precisely, he applies the following algorithm where n is chosen according to Theorem 4.4:
1. Compute K = close(r). Set K r = K l = K and i = 0. 2. While i < n, J = K l and J = K r replace i by i + 1, K r by ρ(K r ), and K l by ρ −1 (K l ).
In the next theorem, we give an upper bound on the number of steps that are necessary for the verfication to succeed. [7] ). This implies
Assume that the response is correct, i.e., there exists a positive generator α ∈ F * with I k i=1 I ei i = αO and |ln α − rc| < ((ln ∆)/4 + 1)(1 + k i=1 e i ). It follows from (17) that there is a generator β = αγ of J with |ln β − rc| < x. By (13), we have |close(rc) − rc| < (ln ∆)/4+1. Since we apply ρ and ρ −1 to find J and since by (11) the step width of two such applications is at least ln 2, we obtain the assertion. 4.8. Timings. We have implemented the real quadratic order PIP-FS identification protocol in C++. The running times given in this section has been measured on a Pentium II, 300 MHz, 64 MB main memory, running SuSe Linux 2.0.35, using the compiler egcs-2.91.57 with option -O2, and using the LiDIA-2.0 library [21] with libI as underlying kernel arithmetic. All timings are given in seconds.
The setup is as follows. For each m ∈ {687, 968, 1208, 1665, 2084}, we choose several discriminants with m bits, run the protocol, including order and key generation, and measure the average time per discriminant. We have run the tests with k = 30, i.e., the probability that a cheating prover is detected is at least 1 − 1/2
30
As challenge, we choose a bit string with 15 bits set to 1. Furthermore, the security parameters are chosen as k 1 = 160, k 2 = 80, and k 3 = 30 (see Section 4.3). 
